Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

Alecia Jensen v. Union Pacific Railroad Company :
Petition for Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Clare Williams; Morris O. Haggerty; Attorneys for Appellees.
Allen K. Young; Young and Kester; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Jensen v. Union Pacific Railroad, No. 950754 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6981

This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court
of Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ALECIA JENSEN,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
APPELLATE COURT NO. 950754-CA

vs.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY,

PRIORITY NO. 15

Defendant/Appellee.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
OF APPELLEE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
The Honorable Boyd L. Park Presiding

J. CLARE WILLIAMS, No. 3490
MORRIS O HAGGERTY, No. 5329
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
406 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1151
Telephone: (801)595-3270

ALLEN K. YOUNG, No. A 3583 of
YOUNG & KESTER
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
406 West 100 South
Springville, Utah 84663
Telephone: (801)621-3317
<t ^ i ,rU:** ^*

E>H££F
UTAH
DOC"

r

•4LS

I

1 l__tl^ ^J

"% 7

MAY - 9 1996

V J

DOCKET' HO.

/«

COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ALECIA JENSEN,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
APPELLATE COURT NO. 950754-CA

vs.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY,

PRIORITY NO. 15

Defendant/Appellee.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
OF APPELLEE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
The Honorable Boyd L. Park Presiding

ALLEN K. YOUNG, No. A 3583 of
YOUNG & KESTER
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
406 West 100 South
Springville, Utah 84663
Telephone: (801)621-3317

J. CLARE WILLIAMS, No. 3490
MORRIS O HAGGERTY, No. 5329
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
406 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1151
Telephone: (801)595-3270

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT UNION PACIFIC
COMPLIED WITH UTAH CODE ANN. § 56-1-14 (1994) BY RINGING THE BELL
ON THE TRAIN

1

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1

ARGUMENT

2

A.
B.
C.

There Are Two Alternative Ways To Comply With §56-1-14
Either of Which is Sufficient

2

The Trial Court Relied On The Sounding Of Both Warnings In
Its Ruling

3

This Court Considered Only The Whistle Alternative And
Overlooked Complying With The Statute By Ringing The
Bell

4

ADDENDUM
1.

Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision

Exhibit 1

2.

Memorandum Decision and Order of the Trial Court

Exhibit 2

I

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Curtis v. Harmon Electronics. Inc.. 575 P.2d 1044
(Utah 1978)

3

Statutes
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 35

1

Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994)

1-4

ii
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Rehearing Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Counsel for petitioner
hereby certifies that the petu

; presented in good

y.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company brought a Motion For Summary
Ji

(hereinafter "trial court").

Summary Judgment was granted on May 15, 1995

i a Memorandum Decision with an

Order Granting Summary Judgment dated June .\

:>peal to this Court was

made by plaintiff Alecia Jensen,

i his Court affirmed the summary judgment on two

grounds and reversed on a third ground in a Memorandum Decision dated April 2b, 199b.
For the Court's convenier

;opy of the Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision is

attached hereto in the Addendum as Exhibit 1 and the Memorandum Decision and Order
of the trial court as Exhibit 2.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In this Court's ruling on its third point, the Court reversed the trial court's decision
on the questioi

.

-14(1994),

because plaintiff Alicia Jensen's affidavit raised an issue of material fact regarding whether
the required warning had been sounded by the train. See Memorandum Decision at 3-4.
The (,i •• irt foci ISPII . ,r. Jensen's affidavit stating that she did not hear the whistle or horn.
In the Court's reasoning this created an issue of material fact on whether the whistle was

1

sounded. Several related legal issues were discussed. However, the Court overlooked
the issue of whether the statute was complied with by ringing the bell on the train as
opposed to sounding the whistle.

The Court overlooked the fact that there was no

evidence presented by Jensen to dispute Union Pacific's properly supported undisputed
testimony that the bell was rung in compliance with the statute for the requisite distance,
and that the ringing of the bell served as a basis for the trial court's original grant of
summary judgment. Thus, the trial court's ruling should have been upheld on that ground
regardless of this Court's ruling on whether there was an issue of material fact regarding
whether the whistle was blown.
ARGUMENT
A.

There Are Two Alternative Ways To Comply With § 56-1-14 Either of
Which is Sufficient.

Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994) provides two alternatives for warning travelers
on a highway.1 First, a bell may be rung:
Every locomotive shall be provided with a b_eji which shall be rung
continuously from a point not less than eighty rods from any city or town
street or public highway grade crossing until such city or town street or
public highway grade crossing shall be crossed....
(Emphasis added.) In the alternative, the statute provides that a whistle may be sounded
instead of a bell:
... but, except in towns and at terminal points, the sounding of the locomotive
whistle or siren at least one-fourth of a mile before reaching any such grade
crossing shall be deemed equivalent to ringing the bell as aforesaid....
(Emphasis added.)
1

The full text of the statute is contained as part of Exhibit A to the Addendum to the
Brief of Appellant.
2

The Utah Supreme Court, in dicta, confirmed the alternative nature of the statute's
requirements in Curtis v. Harmon Electronics. Inc.. 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978).
The statute [56-1-14] requires a bell to be rung for 80 rods (one quarter mile)
before the crossing, for the purpose of warning approaching traffic of the
train's approach. The sounding of the whistle is a substitute for the bell....
The clear intent of the statute is to require either the ringing of a bell or the
sounding of a whistle for one quarter of a mile before entering the crossing.
(Emphasis added.)
B.

The Trial Court Relied On The Sounding Of Both Warnings In Its Ruling.

The trial court's Order Granting Summary Judgment held the statute had been
complied with under both alternatives: "(3) That defendant did sound the train's bell and
whistle as it approached the crossing." (Emphasis added.)
The trial court's Memorandum Decision confirms this. The trial court wrote:
"Defendant alleges that its engineer began sounding the locomotive whistle and bell...",
citing the Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, fflj 7-8 submitted by defendant. Memorandum Decision
at 3. The trial court also noted that defendant was arguing that Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14
(1994) requires either a whistle or bell to be sounded and defendant argued both were
being sounded. Trial Court's Memorandum Decision at 15. The trial court continued and
reviewed the evidence submitted by plaintiff, explained why the train speed graph failed
to show whistles and bells (it was not set up to record these items), rejected statements
of witnesses who heard no warning for failure to provide them in affidavit form, noted that
it was not shown that such witnesses were in a position to hear warnings in any event, and
concluded "(c) that defendant did sound the train's bells and whistle as it approached the
crossing". Jd at 16-17 (emphasis added).

3

C.

This Court Considered Only The Whistle Alternative And Overlooked
Complying With The Statute By Ringing The Bell.

This Court focused on the issue of whether a plaintiff needs to establish that
witnesses were affirmatively listening for warnings or lay a foundation for negative
testimony. Memorandum Decision at 3-4. The Court noted that Jensen had submitted an
affidavit in which she stated she did not hear the train whistle and that only one sworn
statement was necessary to create an issue of fact. Jgl at 32. The Court concluded that
the trial court had thus incorrectly determined that no genuine issues of material fact
existed on the question of whether the train sounded warnings as required by the statute.
Jglat4.
The Court overlooked the fact that there was no sworn statement controverting
defendant's undisputed fact (Puffer Affidavit, cited supra) that the bell was being rung
which alone would prove compliance with the statute. Jensen's affidavit specifically dealt
only with the whistle. ("I did not hear the train blow its whistle or sound its horn anytime
prior to the collision.")

No other sworn statements were submitted.

Thus, it is

uncontradicted and there is no genuine issue of material fact that Utah Code Ann.
§ 56-1-14 (1994) was complied with by ringing the bell. This is a valid ground to uphold
the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Therefore, defendant respectfully requests
the Court to reconsider this matter on that ground.

A
A

DATED this 9th day of May, 1996.

/ ) /)'

2

/• II

/

"**

A

/

The affidavit is contained as part of Exhibit F to the Addendum of the Brief of
Appellant.
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CriSE TITLE:
Alicia Jensen,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Union Pacific Railroad, Inc.,
Defendant and Appellee.

Case No. 950754-CA

April 25, 1996. MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official Publication).
Memorandum Decision of the Court by NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judge; MICHAEL
J. WILKINS, Judge, concurs; and PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judge, concurs in part
and dissents in part, with separate opinion.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of April, 1996, a true and
correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was deposited in the
United States mail to the parties listed below:
Allen K. Young
YOUNG & KESTER
Attorney for Appellant
101 East 200 South
Springville, Utah 84663
J. Clare Williams
Morris 0. Haggerty
Attorneys for Appellee
406 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1151
and a true and correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was
deposited in the United States mail to the district court judge listed
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Honorable Boyd L. Park
Fourth District Court
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TRIAL COURT:
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Case No. 940400280

FILED
APR 2 5 1996
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

00O00

Alicia Jensen,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Not F o r O f f i c i a l
Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No.

950754-CA

Union Pacific Railroad, Inc.,
Defendant and Appellee.

F I L E D
( A p r i l 2 5 , 1996)

Fourth District, Utah County
The Honorable Boyd L. Park
Attorneys:

Allen K. Young, Springville, for Appellant
J. Clare Williams, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Wilkins.
JACKSON, Judge:
Alicia Jensen appeals the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Union Pacific Railroad, Inc. (Union
Pacific) . We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
We review grants of summary judgment for correctness. See
Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). "We
do not defer to the trial court's conclusion that facts are
undisputed nor its legal conclusions supported by those facts."
Oquirrh Assocs. v. First Nat'1 Leasing Co.. 888 P.2d 659, 662
(Utah App. 1994) . Jensen raises three issues on appeal. We
address each in turn.
First, Jensen claims Union Pacific was negligent because
event recorders show the train was traveling up to 1.3 miles per
hour in excess of its maximum timetable speed of 50 miles per
hour just minutes before the accident. Excessive speed of a
train or other vehicle is the cause of an accident only when it
prevents the driver from slowing down, stopping, or controlling
the vehicle to avoid the collision, or when it misleads the
driver of another vehicle. See Horsley v. Robinson. 112 Utah
227, 239-41, 186 P.2d 592, 597-99 (1947); see also Dombeck v.
Chicago. M.. St. P. & Pac. Ry.. 129 N.W.2d 185, 193 (Wis. 1964)
(holding refusal to submit question of train's speed to jury

correct because evidence could not support finding that excessive
speed was causal).
Jensen assumes that had the train been traveling one or two
miles per hour slower, it could have stopped or slowed
sufficiently to avoid the accident. "Trains cannot be stopped in
time to avoid collisions if the time interval is shortened to a
matter of . . . seconds." Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R.. 112
Utah 189, 203-04, 186 P.2d 293, 301 (1947). Former Justice
Crockett declared:
It is contrary to the generally known laws of
physics and common sense to expect the train,
with its great weight and momentum, to stop
within the short distance available after the
instant it should have become apparent that
[the plaintiff] was not going to stop. After
that point was reached, there is nothing the
crew could have done to avoid the collision.
And this true whether the train was
travelling fast or slow and whether the crew
saw [the plaintiff] or not.
Gregory v. Denver & Rio Grande w. P.P.. 8 Utah 2d 114, 118, 329
P.2d 407, 409 (1958) (Crockett, J., concurring). Thus, a train's
speed generally cannot be the cause of crossing collisions as a
matter of law.
Further, in the present case, the train's speed was well
within the federally mandated 60-miles-per-hour limit for the
track in question. See 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) (1994). The train's
speed was also within Union Pacific's timetable speed limit.
Speed indicators on trains must be accurate within plus-or-minus
5 miles per hour at speeds over 30 miles per hour. See 49 C.F.R.
§ 229.117 (1994). Thus, the speed indicator's reading of 51.3
miles per hour places the train within Union Pacific's timetable
speed limit of 50 miles per hour. Jensen cannot prove negligence
per se based simply on a reading of 1.3 miles per hour over the
50-miles-per-hour maximum. Such a claim would have to be based
on a reading in excess of 55 miles per hour. The trial court
correctly determined Jensen's claim of negligent train speed must
fail as a matter of law, and we affirm the trial court's ruling
on that issue.1
1. We do not address Union Pacific's contention that federal law
preempts Jensen's claim of negligent train speed under CSX
Transp.. Tnc. v. Easterwood. 507 U.S. 658, 113 S. Ct. 1732
(1993). Like the trial court, we conclude the train's speed
could not have been a cause of the accident as a matter of law.
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Second, Jensen asserts the crossing was more than ordinarily
hazardous because a Utah Livestock Auction is held nearby on a
weekly basis, creating traffic congestion and noise sufficient to
obstruct the view of and muffle warning signals of on-coming
trains. Liability of railroads for more-than-ordinarilyhazardous crossings is limited to obstructions either created by
the railroad or located on the railroad's right of way. See
Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R.. 842 P.2d 832, 834 (Utah 1992); Gleave
v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.. 749 P.2d 660, 663-64 (Utah App.
1988). Any obstructions making the instant crossing more than
ordinarily hazardous were beyond the control of Union Pacific.
Union Pacific did not create any obstruction at the crossing, and
its right of way was free of obstructions. The trial court
correctly determined Jensen could not establish liability for a
more than ordinarily hazardous crossing as a matter of law, and
we affirm the trial court's ruling on that issue.
Third, Jensen contends Union Pacific is negligent because it
failed to comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 56-114 (1994). Utah law requires trains to sound warnings beginning
one-quarter mile before every grade crossing. It is not
necessary for plaintiffs to establish that witnesses were
affirmatively listening for the warnings or "paying particular
attention to the thing observed [or not observed]." Seybold v.
Union Pac. R.R., 121 Utah 61, 66, 239 P.2d 174, 177 (1951).
"'All that need appear is that the witness was so situated in
relation to the train at the time it is claimed the warnings were
given that said warnings would have awakened her attention to
them.'" Curtis v. Harmon Slecs.. Inc.. 575 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah
1978) (quoting Hudson v. Union Pac. R.R.. 120 Utah 245, 251, 233
P.2d 357, 360 (1951)). Additionally, whether a train sounded
required warnings has been a factual question for juries to
decide since before statehood. See, e.g.. Smith v. Rio Grande W.
Ry., 9 Utah 141, 143, 33 P. 626, 627 (1893).
In response to Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment,
Jensen submitted an affidavit in which she stated she did not
hear the train whistle. "'[I]t only takes one sworn statement
under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the
controversy and create an issue fact.'" Draper City v. Estate of
Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1995) -(quoting Holbrook Co.
v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975)). Nonmoving parties need
not rebut affidavit evidence at the summary judgment stage of
litigation, they need only controvert such statements and thus
create a genuine issue of material fact. See Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). We also observe
[w]hile generally positive testimony (such as
I heard the whistle) is better than negative
testimony (such as I did not hear the

950754-CA
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whistle) the district court may not accept
positive testimony to the exclusion of
negative -estimonv on a motion for summary
judgment. It is a credibility question
whether one witness' memory is more reliable
than another witness' memory, and such
credibility determinations are not to be made
on a motion for summary judgment.
Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc.. 933 F.2d 1548, 1560 n.14 (11th
Cir. 1991), afffd. 507 U.S. 658, 676, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1744
(1993) (emphasis added).
Union Pacific claims Jensen cannot rely on her affidavit to
create an issue of fact because it contradicts her previous
answers to interrogatories.2 However, Union Pacific's
interrogatories did not specifically ask whether Jensen heard the
whistle; thus, her affidavit does not contradict her prior sworn
statements. Union Pacific also claims Jensen's affidavit did not
include statements that she was paying sufficient attention to
have heard the whistle had it been sounded. Despite the
dissent's acceptance of this argument, we can find no Utah law
requiring nonmoving parties to lay such an evidentiary foundation
in an affidavit opposing summary judgment. Nonmoving parties
need only controvert the moving party's assertions, thus creating
a genuine issue of fact. Accordingly, the trial court
incorrectly determined that no genuine issues of material fact
existed on the question of whether tr±e train sounded warnings as
required by Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994), and we reverse the
trial court's ruling on that issue.
In sum, we affirm the trial court's rulings on the issues of
the train's excessive speed and Union Pacific's liability for a
more-than-ordinarily-hazardous crossing. We reverse the trial
court's ruling on the question of whether Union Pacific complied

2. The rule relating to affidavits that contradict prior sworn
testimony grows from cases in which an affidavit contradicts an
earlier deposition. Courts have reasoned that deposition
testimony is more reliable than an affidavit because it is
subject to cross examination. See, e.g., Webster v. Sill. 675
P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983). Such is not the case here.
Answers to interrogatories, like affidavits, are sworn statements
made without cross examination; one sworn statement is not more
probative than another merely because it was made first.

950754-CA
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with Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994) and remand the matter for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I CONCUR:

Michael J. Wilkins, Judge

GREENWOOD, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part) :
I concur in the majority opinion's analysis regarding the
speed of the train and whether the crossing was more than
ordinarily hazardous. I respectfully dissent, however, from the
majority's determination that there is a material issue of fact
on the question of whether the defendant complied with Utah Code
Ann. § 56-1-14 (19 94) by sounding the required warnings. In my
view, plaintiff did not adequately rebut defendant's evidence
that such warnings were sounded. Caselaw in Utah and elsewhere
regarding the probative value of negative testimony in similar
cases holds that the witness must have been positioned so "it is
reasonable to suppose he would have observed had it occurred or
the fact existed." Sevbold v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.. 121 Utah 61,
66, 239 P.2d 174, 177 (1951). See also. Curtis v. Harmon Elecs..
Inc.. 575 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah 1978) (noting that witness's
testimony valueless when attention elsewhere); Hudson v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co.. 120 Utah 245, 251, 233 P.2d 357, 360 (1951)
(noting that witness must be situated so that warnings would have
"awakened her attention to them"); Bebout v. Norfolk & Western
Ry. Co.. 982 F.2d 1178, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing
Illinois rule that negative evidence is probative only if witness
close enough to hear and is paying sufficient attention to have
heard).
Plaintiff's affidavit that she did not hear any warnings,
and may have been playing a "wish" game at the time of the
collision, is bereft of assertions she was paying sufficient
attention to have heard the warnings if they were sounded.

950754-CA
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Consequently, I would affirm the trial court's decision in its
entirety.

Pamela T. Greenwoo

950754-CA
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION

ALECIA JENSEN,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 940400280
DATE May 15, 1995

vs.

JUDGE BOYD L. PARK

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, INC.,
Defendant.
This matter came before the Court on April 17, 1995 for oral argument on
defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. The Court, having received and reviewed the
motion, memorandum in support, memorandum in opposition, reply memorandum, and
supplemental reply memorandum; having heard oral arguments; and having reviewed the
applicable law, now makes the following findings and conclusions:
1.

This Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. Although plaintiff is a resident of

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, defendant Union Pacific Railroad is a Utah corporation
authorized to do business in the State of Utah and in Utah County, State of Utah. The
accident which gave rise to this cause of action occurred in Utah County, State of Utah, and
therefore jurisdiction and venue are properly vested in this Court.
2.

On February 5, 1994, the parties were involved in a collision between defendant's

train and plaintiff's automobile. Plaintiff was a passenger in her automobile, which was
crossing the railroad tracks at approximately 5950 South 650 West in Utah County when the
automobile was struck by a train owned and operated by defendant. Plaintiff alleges she
suffered severe and permanent injuries as a direct and proximate result of this collision.
3.

On February 7, 1995 defendant filed with this Court a Motion For Summary

Judgment and an accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion
For Summary Judgment. On March 2, 1995 plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to
Memorandum Decision 940400280
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Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment and a Request for Hearing on Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. On March 15,
1995 Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment was
filed. On April 12, 1995 Defendant's Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion For Summary Judgment was filed with the Court. Oral arguments on this motion
were heard on April 17, 1995.
4.

The accident giving rise to this cause of action occurred at approximately 12:10

p.m. on February 5, 1994 at a public railroad crossing of defendant's Provo Subdivision
mainline trackage located near 650 West and 5950 South in Spanish Fork, Utah County. At
the time of the accident, plaintiffs automobile was being driven by plaintiffs boyfriend,
Bruce Brinkmeier, also a minor at the time of the accident. Brinkmeier was cited for driving
without a license. The train in question was an empty coal train with three locomotives and
46 trailing empty coal cars. The train weighed 1424 tons and was 2622 feet in length.
5.

According to the train's engineer, the train was traveling from Milford to Provo in

a southwest to northeast direction. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, defendant's Memorandum
in Support, Exhibit D. The trackage at that location is relatively straight and flat. See
Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at f 5(e).
Plaintiffs automobile was traveling southbound on 650 West. The road (650 West) is
straight and flat for hundreds of feet before reaching the crossing. Id. The trackage and
road intersect at an angle greater than 90 degrees with reference to the directions of approach
of the train and car. Id. at ^ 5(a).
6.

The crossing is located in a rural farming area and is surrounded by open fields on

the approach side. A Utah Livestock Auction building and animal pens are located in the
southwest quadrant of the crossing intersection, which is on the opposite side of the tracks
from which plaintiffs automobile approached. The northwest quadrant, which is the view
quadrant for the approaching train and car, is an open field. See Affidavit of Lawrence
Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B. At the time of the accident, a
Memorandum Decision 940400280
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livestock auction was taking place. There was a considerable amount of traffic, and trucks
and trailers were parked near the crossing.
7.

An advance stop sign warning sign was posted alongside 650 West approximately

572 feet north of the crossing. Also posted were an advance railroad crossing warning sign,
an advance railroad crossing sign painted on the road, railroad crossing "crossbuck" signs,
and a stop sign. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support,
Exhibit B.
8.

Defendant alleges that its engineer began sounding the locomotive whistle and bell

approximately 1/4 mile away from the 5950 South crossing and continued to sound them up
to the point of the accident at the 650 West crossing. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, H 7-8,
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. The distance between the 5950 South and
650 West crossings is approximately 1,100 feet. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley,
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at 1 5(b).
9.

At about the time the train passed over the 5950 South crossing, the engineer

noticed a truck pulling a horse trailer begin to drive over the tracks in a southbound
direction. Shortly after seeing the truck/horse trailer clear the crossing, the engineer noticed
plaintiffs automobile rolling towards the crossing. The car was following a few seconds
behind the truck/horse trailer and moving past the stop sign. The engineer placed the train in
emergency braking immediately upon seeing the car. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, ^f 911, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D.
10.

The train was a few hundred feet from the crossing when the engineer first saw

plaintiffs car approaching the intersection. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, ^ 10, defendant's
Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. It took the train approximately 1,400 feet to stop after
emergency braking was initiated. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's
Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at ^ 5(g). The left side of the snowplow of the leading
locomotive struck the right front portion of the car. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, 1 10,
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D; Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's
Memorandum Decision 940400280

3E

Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at f 4(g)-(h). Both occupants were ejected from the car
and thrown in the same northeasterly direction. Neither occupant was wearing a seatbelt.
11.

Defendant alleges that plaintiff and Brinkmeier played a "wish" game upon arrival

at the crossing, lifting their feet from the floor of the car and looking for something metallic
within the car to touch with their fingers while simultaneously making a wish and crossing
the tracks. Plaintiff admits this, but asserts that she has no recollection of doing so just prior
to the collision. The parties agree, for the purpose of the summary judgment motion, that
plaintiff and Brinkmeier never saw or heard the train prior to impact.
12.

The parties agree that the "authorized speed limit" for the trackage in question was

set by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) at 60 m.p.h. for freight trains and 80
m.p.h. for passenger trains. However, defendant Union Pacific voluntarily filed with the
FRA a lower "timetable" speed of only 50 m.p.h. for its freight trains. Plaintiff argues that
it is this timetable speed that applies rather than the FRA's authorized speed limit of 60
m.p.h.
13.

Defendant claims that the train was traveling between 49 and 51 m.p.h. for at least

the last three miles before the engineer initiated emergency braking. See Affidavit of Ryan
Puffer, t 5, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D; Affidavit of George E.
Ohlsson, 1 7, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F. Plaintiff argues that the train
was traveling an average speed of 51.5 m.p.h. for the three minutes prior to the collision.
See Affidavit of Dennis Andrews, f 8, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 2.
14.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact

exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See U.R.C.P. 56;
Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Furthermore, "[ajlthough summary judgment may on occasion be appropriate in negligence
cases, it is appropriate only in the most clear-cut case." Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d
126, 126 (1987) (citing Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982)).
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15.

Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment addresses three areas of analysis: 1)

Union Pacific was not negligent in traveling in excess of the timetable speed limit; 2) Union
Pacific did not fail to reduce the speed of its train through what plaintiff alleged to be a
"more than ordinarily hazardous crossing"; and 3) Union Pacific complied with requirements
of U.C.A. § 56-1-14, which governs the use of whistles and bells when approaching railroad
crossings. The Court will analyze these issues individually.
Authorized Speed Limit
16.

Although the FRA has set the speed limit for freight trains at 60 m.p.h., Union

Pacific has voluntarily chosen to set a lower "timetable" speed limit of 50 m.p.h. for its
freight trains, 10 m.p.h. below the speed limit mandated by the FRA. According to
plaintiffs accident reconstructionist, the train was averaging a speed of 51.5 m.p.h. for the
three minutes prior to the collision. See Affidavit of Dennis Andrews (Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2). At
oral arguments, plaintiff presented a speed graph obtained from the train's recorder. That
graph indicated variations in the train's speed prior to the accident, and recorded the train's
speed as varying from 50 m.p.h. to as much as 52.5 m.p.h.
17.

Based on data retrieved from the train's Pulse Electronics "speed recorder" device

which electronically recorded the train's speed on tape prior to the accident, defendant claims
that the train was traveling between 49 and 51 m.p.h. for at least the last three miles before
emergency braking was initiated. See Affidavit of George Ohlsson (defendant's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment,
Exhibit F); see also Pulse Electronic printout (defendant's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit A). In the Affidavit of
George E. Ohlsson, Manager of Operating Practices for Union Pacific Railroad (see
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F), Mr. Ohlsson stated the following:
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It is difficult for even the most competent engineer to maintain a long and
heavy train at a certain and undeviating speed. The curvature and
undulation of the trackage will retard and increase the speed of a long and
heavy train even though an engineer is holding a steady throttle on the
locomotive. A train which travels for a number of miles at a speed which
does not deviate more than one or two miles an hour is, in my
professional opinion, going at a steady speed. It is simply not possible to
control a train's speed any better than that.
Id. at 1 8.
18.

Defendant argues that the FRA's "authorized speed limit" of 60 m.p.h. for freight

trains preempts plaintiffs claim of excessive speed. Defendant cites CSX Transportation,
Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S.Ct. 1732 (1993) in support of its argument that plaintiffs claims
of common law negligence are unfounded. In Easterwood, the plaintiff sued for the death of
her husband resulting from a railroad crossing accident, alleging that CSX was negligent
under Georgia law for failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing and for
operating the train at an excessive speed. The authorized speed limit for the track in
Easterwood was set at 60 m.p.h. and, while conceding that the train was traveling at a speed
under 60 m.p.h., Easterwood nevertheless claimed that CSX breached its common-law duty
to operate its train at a moderate and safe rate of speed.
19.

The federal regulations involved in Easterwood had been issued by the Secretary of

Transportation pursuant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), which
established an authorized speed limit of 60 m.p.h. for freight trains. A clause of the FRSA
permits states to adopt or continue in force any state law, rule, regulation, order, or standard
relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary adopted a regulation covering the
subject matter of such state requirement. The preemption clause of the FRSA (45 U.S.C.S.
§ 434) confers on the Secretary of Transportation the power to preempt state common law.
Given the Secretary's adoption of train-speed regulations pursuant to the FRSA (49 C.F.R. §
213.9(a)), a state's common-law restrictions on train speed are not preserved by a saving
clause in 45 U.S.C.S. § 434, under which a state may continue in force an additional or
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more stringent law relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an
essentially local safety hazard and when not incompatible with any federal law. Easterwood,
113 S.Ct. at 1743 (1993).
20.

The Court in Easterwood found for CSX, who had argued that Easterwood's claim

was preempted because the federal speed limits are regulations covering the subject matter of
the common law of train speeds. The Court further stated that to hold otherwise would be to
deprive the Secretary of the power to preempt state common law, a power clearly conferred
by § 434. Therefore, the Court found that Easterwood's reliance on the common law was
incompatible with both the FRSA and the Secretary's regulations. Id. at 1743.
21.

In the case now before this Court, defendant argues that its train was traveling well

below the federally imposed speed limit of 60 m.p.h. for freight trains. "The fact that the
Union Pacific had set a lower 'timetable' speed limit than that specified by the FRA is
irrelevant since any claim based upon a violation of the railroad set limit would be but a
variation of plaintiffs common law negligence claim of excessive or unreasonable speed."
See Defendant's Memorandum in Support at 8, t 122.

Plaintiff argues that, because defendant filed its timetable with the FRA pursuant to

49 C.F.R. 217, the Court should consider that action as evidence that the maximum
authorized speed at the intersection of the collision is 50 m.p.h. and that timetables filed with
the FRA are therefore enforceable against the defendant, and train speeds in excess of those
timetables violate federal law. See Affidavit of Bruce Reading (plaintiffs Memorandum in
Opposition, Exhibit 1). Furthermore, plaintiff claims that this case is distinguishable from
Easterwood because there is no attempt to impose on Union Pacific a state-enforced speed
regulation which is more stringent than its federal counterpart. Instead, plaintiff claims that
defendant's train was exceeding its own maximum authorized timetable speed, thus violating
federal law, and that defendant was therefore negligent.
23.

Given the ruling in Easterwood and the parties' arguments, the issue now before the

Court is (a) whether Union Pacific's timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. for freight trains is a
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variation of plaintiffs common law negligence claim of excessive speed and thus preempted
by federal law governing the"subject area," or (b) whether the FRSA covers speed limits
self-imposed by Union Pacific and, if not, whether defendant was negligent in exceeding its
speed limit for freight trains.
24.

The FRSA specifically permits states to adopt or continue in force any state law,

rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary
adopts a regulation covering the subject matter of such state requirement. This legislation
was designed to prevent states from interfering with regulations established by the FRA. In
this case, it is clear that the FRA had designated an "authorized speed limit" of 60 m.p.h.
for freight trains traveling along this stretch of track. However, the State of Utah has not
attempted to impose a more stringent law, rule, or regulation regarding authorized train
speed. Instead, Union Pacific has created its own timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. The Court
finds the present case to be distinguishable from Easterwood, where the State of Georgia
tried to impose law, rules, or regulations governing train speed. The Court in Easterwood
did not explain how the FRSA addresses the question of timetable speeds which are a) selfimposed by railroad companies and not by States; and b) lower than the federally authorized
train speeds.
25.

In his affidavit, plaintiffs witness Bruce Reading alleges that, under federal law,

each railroad company is required to file a copy of its Operating Rules and Timetables with
the FRA, and concludes that the speed limits mandated in the Union Pacific Railroad
Company Operating Rules and Timetables thus become the federally mandated guidelines and
maximum speed limits for the railroad company and are enforceable by the FRA. See
Affidavit of Bruce Reading, W 4-9, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 1.
Accordingly, Union Pacific's self-imposed timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. would become its
federally authorized speed and could not be preempted by the FRA.
26.

Defendant argues that 49 C.F.R. § 217 does not authorize timetables to change the

federal speed limits set in 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 and that timetable filings therefore have no
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effect on the maximum speeds at which a railroad may operate its trains. According to
defendant, section 217 requires only the filing of operating rules and timetables, which may
or may not contain speed limits, and does not require that speed limit changes be filed with
the FRA. Defendant again turns to the Easterwood decision and argues that it is § 213.9
which sets the "ceiling" or "maximum" speed, not timetables, and asserts that "[i]mplicit in
such holding is the understanding that while a railroad may not exceed such limit, it may by
internal fiat voluntarily operate its trains at any slower speed deemed appropriate." See
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support at 4.
27.

The Easterwood case does not provide any clear rule as to how one should address

the issue of timetable speeds within 49 C.F.R. §§ 217 and 213.9. However, plaintiff has
equally failed to provide any case law which would substantiate her claim that Union
Pacific's timetable filing under § 217 has an effect on the maximum speed at which a
railroad may operate its train under § 213.9. Defendant has provided the Court with the
recent case of Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Oregon, 9 F.3d 807
(9th Cir. 1993), which supports defendant's argument that the FRA, by requiring Union
Pacific to file its timetable speed limits, does not thereby adopt that timetable limit as a
federal law enforceable against the railroad and preemptive of the speed limits set forth in 49
C.F.R. §213.9. In Southern Pacific, an Oregon law permitted local authorities to ban the
sounding of locomotive whistles under certain conditions. Southern Pacific Transportation
Company argued that the state law was preempted by three federal statutes and moved for
summary judgment. The state of Oregon made a cross-motion for summary judgment,
claiming that its regulations were not preempted as a matter of law. Following the Supreme
Court's decision in Easterwood, the circuit court held that the state law and regulations were
not preempted by any of the three federal statutes cited by Southern Pacific and affirmed the
district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the State of Oregon.
28.

In addressing Southern Pacific's claim that the Oregon statute was also preempted

by 45 C.F.R. § 217, which requires railroads to keep their operating rules on file with the
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FRA, the circuit court stated that M[b]ecause the FRA neither approves nor adopts the
railroad's rules in any manner, the rules do not have the force of law and therefore cannot
preempt the Oregon statute." Southern Pacific, 9.F3d at 812 n.5. This statement is equally
applicable in the case now before this Court, in that it supports defendant's argument that 49
C.F.R. § 217 does not authorize timetables to change the federal speed limits set in 49
C.F.R. § 213.9. The railroad's rules and timetable filings submitted to the FRA in
accordance with section 217 are not approved or adopted by the FRA and therefore do not
have the force of law.
29.

Even if defendant were bound by its timetable speed of 50 m.p.h., there still

remain the questions of (a) whether Union Pacific was negligent in exceeding that speed, and
(b) if the train's speed was a proximate cause of the collision.
30.

The train's speed in this matter was not a causal factor unless the train could have

stopped, prior to collision, from the point at which plaintiff first saw the danger. The Court
agrees with the holding in Dombeck v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 129
N.W.2d 185 (Wise. 1964). In that case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that, even
under an assumption that the train's speed was negligent, such speed as a matter of law could
not be causal:
In order to be causal the train's speed must either have misled . . . the
driver of the car or it must have interfered with the control and
management of the train to the extent of rendering it probable that such
control and management would have otherwise been effective to have
avoided the collision.
Id. at 192. As to the first prong of this test, whether Brinkmeier, as driver, or plaintiff, as
passenger, were misled as to the speed of the train, plaintiff stated in her affidavit that she
did not see the train prior to the collision, nor did she hear the train blow its whistle or
sound its horn prior to the collision. See Affidavit of Alicia Jensen, H 7-8, Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 3. In his recorded statement, Mr. Brinkmeier also
stated that he did not hear the train or its horn. See the recorded statement of Bruce
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Brinkmeier at 15, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 4. The Court finds that,
because both plaintiff and Brinkmeier admit that they were not looking or listening for a
train, and because both stated that they never saw or heard the train prior to impact, neither
could have been misled as to the speed of the train in estimating its time of arrival at the
crossing. As to the second prong of this test, whether the train's speed interfered with the
control and management of the train to the extent of rendering it probable that such control
and management would have otherwise been effective to have avoided the collision, the
Court finds that plaintiff has made no argument or produced any evidence that the train could
have been stopped or sufficiently slowed to have allowed plaintiff's automobile to safely
cross the tracks if the train had indeed been traveling 50 m.p.h. at the time the engineer
activated the emergency brakes. Defendant, however, provided the Court with the Affidavit
of Ryan Puffer, the engineer. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. In his
affidavit, Engineer Puffer stated that he placed the train into emergency braking as soon as
he saw plaintiffs automobile, because it was his impression that the car was not going to
stop and was going to come onto the track directly in front of the train. He further stated .
that "[a] long heavy train takes a number of seconds, after placing it into emergency braking,
before it even begins to slow down. On this occasion the train did not even begin to slow
down before the accident happened." Id. at \ 11. In addition, defendant provided the Court
with the affidavit of George E. Ohlsson, Manager of Operating Practices for Union Pacific
Railroad Company. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F. In his affidavit,
Mr. Ohlsson stated that the small difference between the 50 m.p.h. timetable speed and an
actual speed of approximately 51 m.p.h. "would not have made any significant difference in
terms of how far the train would have gone before slowing down or stopping after the brakes
were applied. A matter of 1 m.p.h. is, in my opinion, insignificant in terms of stopping time
and distance." Id. at \ 10.
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31.

For these reasons, the Court finds that, even if the train had been traveling one or

two miles above the timetable speed limit of 50 m.p.h., the train's speed was not a
proximate cause of the accident.
Dangerous Crossing
32.

According to the Utah Supreme court in English v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 P.47

(1896), a crossing that is "more than ordinarily hazardous" places an additional duty of care
on the railroad. Plaintiff argues that several conditions existed at the time of the accident
which created a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing. These conditions include (a) an
auction barn near the tracks accompanied by the busy nature of a livestock auction; and (b)
trucks and trailers parked near the crossing which may have impeded vision or caused
plaintiff to not hear the train as it approached. According to plaintiff, the accident occurred
during a time when the commotion and noise of a livestock auction rendered the nearby
crossing "more than ordinarily hazardous."
33.

More recently, the Utah Court of Appeals applied the English standard of "more

than ordinarily hazardous" in Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 749 P.2d
660 (Utah App. 1988). In Gleave, the plaintiff was hit by an empty coal train at a crossing
in Springville, Utah. The court instructed the jury that "UDOT was statutorily given
ultimate responsibility for crossing design and warning and safety devices and that,
accordingly, [the jury] could not find Rio Grande negligent 'based upon any defects which
might exist with respect to the design of the 1600 South crossing or based upon any problems
you may perceive in the lack of traffic warning devices' there." Id. at 663. The jury found
the crossing to be more than ordinarily hazardous and then farther found that Rio Grande
failed to exercise reasonable care in driving the train across the roadway "given the
crossing's design, its physical characteristics, and the existing warning signs." Id. at 664.
The conditions that contributed to this "hazardous" crossing in Gleave included a dangerous
crossing angle, a mound of earth, and a curving track.
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34.

In Duncan v. Union Pacific R.R., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992), a car containing a

driver and three passengers was struck by a freight train in Tooele County on Droubay Road.
While the road intersected the track at 43 degrees on the north and 136 degrees on the south,
nothing obstructed the motorist's view of the tracks for several thousand feet. The Utah
Supreme court in Duncan affirmed the trial court's finding that the "crossing was not 'more
than ordinarily hazardous' because plaintiffs could not demonstrate, or even suggest, what
more Union Pacific could have done to make this crossing safer, short of installing automatic
warning lights and signs and gates, which admittedly was not its responsibility." Id. at 833.
However, the Duncan court did reiterate the criteria used in the English case to determine
whether a crossing would be found to be more than ordinarily hazardous:
[A] crossing might be found to be more than ordinarily hazardous if it was
in a thickly populated portion of a city; if the view of the tracks was
obstructed because of the railroad itself or natural objects; if the crossing
was frequented by heavy traffic so that approaching trains could not be
heard; or if, for any reason, devices employed at the crossing were
rendered inadequate to warn the public of the danger of an approaching
train.
Id. at 834 (quoting English, 13 Utah at 419-20, 45 P. at 50 (1896)).
35.

In light of the criteria set forth in English and reiterated in Duncan, the plaintiff in

this case now argues that conditions present at the time of the accident, namely the auction
barn and the traffic and commotion which accompany a livestock auction, meet the criteria of
a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing. Plaintiff further argues that a factfinder should
therefore be allowed to determine if the crossing was hazardous and, if so, whether
defendant exercised reasonable care when driving the train across this particular railroad
crossing.
36.

While not agreeing that the crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous, defendant

argues that, assuming arguendo, "such a scenario does not impose a duty upon Union Pacific
to reduce the train's speed below the federally mandated limit." See defendant's
Memorandum in Support at 9, f 1. Defendant argues that the plaintiff in Easterwood also
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alleged unsafe crossing conditions requiring additional warning devices. However, despite
the Easterwood court's finding that plaintiff may have had a viable claim for an unsafe
crossing, the Court found that the railroad had no duty to reduce the train's speed below the
federal limit. Defendant argues that its train was traveling 10 m.p.h. below the federal limit
and that because the FRA sets train speeds with crossing safety concerns already in mind,
plaintiffs allegation of defendant's failure to reduce the speed of its train through the "more
than ordinarily hazardous" crossing is unfounded.
37.

Defendant further argues that, when a crossing is deemed to be extrahazardous, a

railroad's duty of care is limited to those unsafe conditions which it created or over which it
has responsibility. See defendant's Reply Memorandum at 13. Defendant cites Gleave v.
Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Duncan v.
Union Pacific R. Co., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1990), in alleging that a railroad's duty of care
extends only to obstructions to view or sound caused by the railroad or located on railroad
right of way or property. Defendant then cites Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-19, which places a
duty of care on property owners to remove vegetation or other obstructions on their property which constitute a traffic hazard by obstructing the view of any motor vehicle operator, and
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-14 et seq., which delegates to the Utah Department of Transportation
(UDOT) the responsibility for regulating the safe travel of motorists on roads and highways,
including those which pass over and across railroad tracks.
38.

This Court finds that, even if a jury could determine the existence of conditions that

would make the accident site a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing, those conditions
were not the responsibility of defendant. The noise around the auction was not something
within defendant's control. The fact that there were "No Parking" signs posted around the
area following the accident to prevent parked cars from obstructing drivers' views of the
railroad track does not imply any lack of care on defendant's part prior to the accident, since
such precautions are not the defendant's responsibility.
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39.

For these reasons, the Court finds that, even if the railroad crossing was a "more

than ordinarily hazardous" crossing when a livestock auction was in progress, any unusually
hazardous conditions resulting from the auction were not defendant's responsibility.
U.C.A § 56-1-14 (Locomotive Bells & Whistles)
40.

Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 governs the operation of locomotive whistle and bell

devices at public railroad crossings. It provides as follows:
Every locomotive shall be provided with a bell which shall be rung
continuously from a point not less than than 80 rods from any city or town
street or public highway grade crossing until such city or town street or
public highway grade shall be crossed, but, except in towns and at
terminal points, the sounding of the locomotive whistle or siren at least
1/4 of a mile before reaching any such grade crossing shall be deemed
equivalent to ringing the bell as aforesaid. . .
Id. According to defendant, where the grade crossing is in a rural area such as the one in
question, the requirement is that either the bell or the whistle must be operated beginning "at
least" 1320 feet from the crossing. Defendant argues that Engineer Puffer sounded both the
bell and the whistle approximately 1/4 of a mile from the crossing, well in excess of the
statutorily required distance of 1320 feet.
41.

Plaintiff argues that neither the driver nor the passenger of the car ever heard the

train's whistle or bells prior to the accident. See Affidavit of Alicia Jensen, Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 3, and the recorded statement of Bruce Brinkmeier,
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 4. Plaintiff alleges that the Pulse Electronics
graph, attached to the Affidavit of Bruce Reading, indicates that no whistles or bells were
sounded by the train as it approached the crossing. Plaintiff points to the statements of
several witnesses who were near the crossing at the time of the accident. In their voluntary
statements to police, Gerald and Whitney Hill made no mention of the train's whistle or bells
at the time of the accident. Other witnesses also made voluntary statements to police and
said nothing about hearing the train's whistle or bells at the time of the accident. However,
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plaintiff has not provided the Court with any such statements in affidavit form, as required
by Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
42.

The failure of the Pulse Electronics graph to record the whistle or bells of the train

prior to the accident is explained by George E. Ohlsson in his Supplemental Affidavit. Mr.
Ohlsson stated that the event recorder device installed on the locomotive used only 8-track
cassettes, which do not have sufficient channels to record everything relative to the operation
of the train; specifically, the 8-track cassette does not have a channel for showing whether
the horn or whistle was being sounded. See Supplemental Affidavit of George E. Ohlsson, \
2. Mr. Ohlsson further stated that Union Pacific is beginning to replace the 8-track cassette
event recorders with solid state event recorders which are capable of recording the sounding
of a train's whistle. Id. at ^ 4. Furthermore, there is testimony in the police record to
support defendant's claim that the train did sound its whistle and bells at some point before
reaching the crossing, and that there were witnesses to the accident who did hear the train's
whistle and bells. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit A (Voluntary
Statements of Johnny Starks and Robert Craw). Ryan Puffer, engineer of the train, stated
that he began sounding the whistle and the bells approximately 1/4 mile away from the
crossing at 5950 South, and then continued operating the bells and whistle from 5950 South
for another 1100 feet until the train reached the crossing at 650 West where the accident
occurred. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit C.
43.

The Court finds that, despite plaintiffs reference to the voluntary statements of

witnesses who said nothing about having heard the train's bells or whistle, plaintiff did not
submit any affidavits to that effect in accordance with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Furthermore, there is no evidence to indicate that
those witnesses were in a position to hear the bells and whistles if they had in fact been
sounded. Conversely, defendant submitted the affidavit of the train's engineer, Ryan Puffer,
who stated that he checked the train prior to leaving Milford to verify that the brakes,
whistle, and headlights worked properly. Mr. Puffer also stated that he sounded the train's
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bells and whistles for over 1/4 of a mile prior to reaching the crossing at 5950 South, and
continued to sound the whistle beyond that crossing because he knew there was another
crossing (the 650 West crossing) shortly beyond the 5950 South crossing. Finally, Mr.
Puffer stated that he was sounding the whistle continuously as he watched the truck and horse
trailer cross the tracks just ahead of plaintiffs automobile.
44.

The Court finds the affidavit evidence presented is uncontradicted and that

defendant did appropriately sound the train's bells and whistle as warning.
Conclusion
45.

The Court concludes (a) that the speed of defendant's train was not a proximate

cause of the accident; (b) that defendant was not responsible for any conditions which may
have been present at the time of the accident and creating a "more than ordinarily hazardous"
crossing; and (c) that defendant did sound the train's bells and whistle as it approached the
crossing. Therefore, the Court finds no genuine issues of material fact remain as to
defendant's liability to plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court grants defendant's Motion For
Summary Judgment.
Counsel for defendant is to prepare, within 15 days of the date hereof, an order
consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to
form prior to submission to the Court for signature.
Dated at Provo, Utah this 15th day of May, 1995.
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J. Clare Williams
Allen Young

Memorandum Decision 940400280

TF

J. CLARE WILLIAMS, #3490
MORRIS O HAGOERTY, #5283
Attorneys for Defendant
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
406 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1151
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALECIA JENSEN,

)
)

Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY
Defendant.

)
)
)

Civil No. 940400280
Judge Boyd L. Park

Defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for
hearing by the Court on April 17, 1995; with defendant being represented by J. Clare Williams
and plaintiff, who was present in the courtroom, being represented by Allen K. Young; and with
the parties having filed written briefs and exhibits and having argued their respective positions to
the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now rules as follows:
The Court finds and concludes:
(1)

That the speed of defendant's train was not a proximate cause of the

accident;
(2)

That defendant was not responsible for any conditions which may have

been present at the time of the accident and created a "more than ordinarily hazardous"

crossing; and
(3)

That defendant did sound the train's bell and whistle as it approached the

crossing.
Therefore, the Courtfindsthat there is no genuine issue as to any material fact to prevent
it from acting on defendant's motion as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the Court hereby grants defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and
orders plaintiffs Complaint dismissed w^th prejudice, with each party to pay its own costs and
expenses.
DATED this tf day of June, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

Approved as to form this
of
, 1995.

Allen K. Young
Attorney for Plaintiff
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